Debt Complaint Filed July 12, 2024 (2024)

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Jul 05, 2024 |Courtroom, 1101 |Consumer Debt - Non-Jury |20241117457

Ruling

ISAAC COHEN, AN INDIVIDUAL VS TESLA, INC., A CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY,

Jul 17, 2024 |23STCV29419

Case Number: 23STCV29419 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Dept: 50 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Department 50 ISAAC COHEN, et al., Plaintiffs, vs. TESLA, INC., et al., Defendants. Case No.: 23STCV29419 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Hearing Time: 10:00 a.m. [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: DEFENDANT TESLA, INC.S MOTION TO COMPEL BINDING ARBITRATION Background Plaintiff Isaac Cohen (Plaintiff) filed this action on December 1, 2023 against Defendant Tesla, Inc. (Defendant). The Complaint alleges causes of action for (1) violation of lemon law, (2) breach of implied warranty of merchantability, (3) negligent repair, (4) misrepresentation, and (5) violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that on or about April 10, 2022, he purchased a 2022 Tesla Model Y automobile. (Compl., ¶ 12.) Plaintiff alleges that [s]oon after purchase of the automobile, Plaintiff began experiencing nonconformities with the automobile that required Plaintiff to return to TESLAs authorized repair facilities on several occasions during the warranty period. (Compl., ¶ 28.) Plaintiff alleges that [s]uch nonconformities included defects that substantially impaired the automobiles use, safety, and/or value. (Compl., ¶ 30.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have failed and refused, and continue to fail and refuse, to replace the automobile or make restitution. (Compl., ¶ 47.) Defendant now moves for an order compelling Plaintiff to arbitrate his claims, and for an order staying this action pending the outcome of arbitration. Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion. Request for Judicial Notice The Court grants Defendants request for judicial notice. Legal Standard In a motion to compel arbitration, the moving party must prove by a preponderance of evidence the existence of the arbitration agreement and that the dispute is covered by the agreement. The burden then shifts to the resisting party to prove by a preponderance of evidence a ground for denial (e.g., fraud, unconscionability, etc.). ((Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413-414.) Generally, on a petition to compel arbitration, the court must grant the petition unless it finds either (1) no written agreement to arbitrate exists; (2) the right to compel arbitration has been waived; (3) grounds exist for revocation of the agreement; or (4) litigation is pending that may render the arbitration unnecessary or create conflicting rulings on common issues. ((Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2); ((Condee v. Longwood Management Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 218-219.) California has a strong public policy in favor of arbitration and any doubts regarding the arbitrability of a dispute are resolved in favor of arbitration. ((Coast Plaza Doctors Hospital v. Blue Cross of California (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 677, 686.) This strong policy has resulted in the general rule that arbitration should be upheld unless it can be said with assurance that an arbitration clause is not susceptible to an interpretation covering the asserted dispute. (Ibid. [internal quotations omitted].) This is in accord with the liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), which governs all agreements to arbitrate in contracts involving interstate commerce. (9 U.S.C. section 2, et seq.; ((Higgins v. Superior Court (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1247.) Discussion A. Existence of Arbitration Agreement In support of the motion, Defendant submits the Declaration of Raymond Kim, who is a Manager, Business Resolution with Defendant. (Kim Decl., ¶ 2.) In his declaration, Mr. Kim states that Plaintiff initially ordered a 2022 Tesla Model Y with VIN 7SAYGDEF0NF485321 (the Subject Vehicle) from Tesla on or about April 10, 2022. In placing that order, Plaintiff agreed to the terms of a Motor Vehicle Order Agreement (Order Agreement), thereby agreeing to be bound by its terms and conditions, which included an agreement to arbitrate. Attached hereto as Exhibit 1 is a true and correct copy of the Order Agreement between Plaintiff and Tesla, Inc. detailing the terms and conditions of Plaintiffs purchase of the Subject Vehicle that I obtained from Tesla, Inc.s electronic document storage kept in the ordinary course of business. (Kim Decl., ¶ 3.) Mr. Kim states that Plaintiff placed the order by clicking a Place Order button on Teslas website. Plaintiff would not have been able to place the order without clicking this button on Teslas website or authorizing someone to do so on Plaintiffs behalf. Prior to placing the order, Plaintiff would see text and be advised that Plaintiff are [sic] agreeing to the Order Agreements terms and conditions. There would be a hyperlink to the Order Agreement terms and conditions that the Plaintiff could click on and view prior to proceeding with the order. If a customer clicks on this hyperlink, a new window would open revealing the Order Agreement. Further, once executed, the Order Agreement would become visible to the customer on the customers mytesla.com account for as long as the customer owns the vehicle. Once an Order Agreement is executed, as was done here, the Order Agreement is automatically saved to the electronic document storage system containing all of the documents related to the subject transaction. Given my knowledge and understanding of Teslas procedures, the Order Agreement only ends up in the electronic file (as it did here) after a consumer has executed the Order Agreement. (Kim Decl., ¶ 4.) The Motor Vehicle Order Agreement attached as Exhibit 1 to Mr. Kims declaration provides, inter alia, as follows: Agreement to Arbitrate. Please carefully read this provision, which applies to any dispute between you and Tesla, Inc. and its affiliates, (together Tesla). If you have a concern or dispute, please send a written notice describing it and your desired resolution to resolutions@tesla.com. If not resolved within 60 days, you agree that any dispute arising out of or relating to any aspect of the relationship between you and Tesla will not be decided by a judge or jury but instead by a single arbitrator in an arbitration administered by the American Arbitration Association (AAA) under its Consumer Arbitration Rules. This includes claims arising before this Agreement, such as claims related to statements about our products. We will pay all AAA fees for any arbitration, which will be held in the city or county of your residence. To learn more about the Rules and how to begin an arbitration, you may call any AAA office or go to www.adr.org. The arbitrator may only resolve disputes between you and Tesla, and may not consolidate claims without the consent of all parties. The arbitrator cannot hear class or representative claims or requests for relief on behalf of others purchasing or leasing Tesla vehicles. In other words, you and Tesla may bring claims against the other only in your or its individual capacity and not as a plaintiff or class member in any class or representative action. If a court or arbitrator decides that any part of this agreement to arbitrate cannot be enforced as to a particular claim for relief or remedy, then that claim or remedy (and only that claim or remedy) must be brought in court and any other claims must be arbitrated. If you prefer, you may instead take an individual dispute to small claims court. You may opt out of arbitration within 30 days after signing this Agreement by sending a letter to: Tesla, Inc.; P.O. Box 15430; Fremont, CA 94539-7970, stating your name, Vehicle Identification Number, and intent to opt out of the arbitration provision. If you do not opt out, this agreement to arbitrate overrides any different arbitration agreement between us, including any arbitration agreement in a lease or finance contract. (Kim Decl., ¶ 3, Ex. 1.) In his supporting declaration, Mr. Kim states that [w]hile the customer may opt out of the Agreement to Arbitrate by sending a letter to Tesla stating that intention within thirty days of execution of the Order Agreement, Plaintiff did not do so. Tesla maintains letters in which its customers opted out of the Agreement to Arbitrate, but it did not receive any such letter from Plaintiff. (Kim Decl., ¶ 5.) Defendant asserts that all of Plaintiffs Claims fall well within the scope of the Agreement to Arbitrate. The relevant language in the arbitration provision provides that the parties agree: any dispute arising out of or relating to any aspect of the relationship between you and Tesla will not be decided by a judge or jury but instead by a single arbitrator in an arbitration administered by the American Arbitration Association (AAA) under its Consumer Arbitration Rules.&All of the Plaintiffs claims arise out of the relationship between Plaintiff and Tesla. (Mot. at p. 10:8-14, citing Kim Decl., ¶ 3, Ex. 1.) In the opposition, Plaintiff states that he opposes the instant motion with respect to Plaintiffs fourth and fifth causes of action. Thus, Plaintiff does not appear to dispute that he agreed to the subject Agreement or that it covers the first, second, and third causes of action of Plaintiffs Complaint. In the opposition, Plaintiff first asserts that [f]ederal law precludes pre-dispute binding arbitration of warranty disputes. (Oppn at p. 3:10.) Plaintiff appears to be arguing that federal law precludes arbitration of Plaintiffs fifth cause of action for violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. Plaintiff cites to 16 C.F.R. § 703.5, subdivision (j), which provides that [d]ecisions of the Mechanism shall not be legally binding on any person. However, the warrantor shall act in good faith, as provided in § 703.2(g) of this part. In any civil action arising out of a warranty obligation and relating to a matter considered by the Mechanism, any decision of the Mechanism shall be admissible in evidence, as provided in section 110(a)(3) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. 2310(a)(3). 16 C.F.R. § 703.1, subdivision (e) provides that [m]echanism means an informal dispute settlement procedure which is incorporated into the terms of a written warranty to which any provision of Title I of the Act applies, as provided in section 110 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. 2310. Plaintiff appears to assert that under these provisions, pre-dispute binding mandatory arbitration of any warranty claim is unlawful. (Oppn at p. 3:14.) In the reply, Defendant counters that the instant matter does not involve a mandatory pre-dispute arbitration provision. The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act requires resort to an informal dispute resolution if the manufacturer makes one available to its customers. (Reply at p. 3:14-16, emphasis omitted.) Defendant cites to 15 U.S.C. § 2310, which provides in part that Congress hereby declares it to be its policy to encourage warrantors to establish procedures whereby consumer disputes are fairly and expeditiously settled through informal dispute settlement mechanisms. (15 U.S.C. § 2310, subd. (a)(1).) Plaintiff also cites to Exhibit D to Plaintiffs counsels declaration, which is the Federal Register/Vol. 80, No. 138, dated July 20, 2015. (Davoodi Decl., ¶ 4, Ex. D.) This document concerns, inter alia, the Federal Trade Commissions final action concerning review of interpretations of Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. (Davoodi Decl., ¶ 4, Ex. D, p. 1.) The document provides, inter alia, that [s]ince the issuance of the 1999 FRN, courts have reached different conclusions as to whether the MMWA gives the Commission authority to ban mandatory binding arbitration in warranties&In particular, two appellate courts have questioned whether Congress intended binding arbitration to be considered a type of [informal dispute settlement mechanism], which would potentially place binding arbitration outside the scope of the MMWA&Nonetheless, the Commission reaffirms its long-held view that the MMWA disfavors, and authorizes the Commission to prohibit, mandatory binding arbitration in warranties. (Davoodi Decl., ¶ 4, Ex. D, p. 10.) However, Plaintiff does not appear to cite to binding legal authority demonstrating that Plaintiffs cause of action for violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act may not be subject to arbitration. In addition, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff seems to argue that the Magnuson-Moss Act preempts the FAA and creates an unqualified right of access to the courts for consumers claiming breach of warranty claims, and further, that the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has promulgated rules and that the Court should follow the FTCs construction of the statute&Here, as in Epic, the FTC is not responsible for administering the FAA and their interpretation of the Magnuson-Moss Act as it applies to that statute is therefore not subject to deference. (Reply at p. 3:1-9.) In Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis (2018) 584 U.S. 497, 502-503, cited by Defendant, the United States Supreme Court noted, [s]hould employees and employers be allowed to agree that any disputes between them will be resolved through one-on-one arbitration? Or should employees always be permitted to bring their claims in class or collective actions, no matter what they agreed with their employers? As a matter of policy these questions are surely debatable. But as a matter of law the answer is clear&In the Federal Arbitration Act, Congress has instructed federal courts to enforce arbitration agreements according to their termsincluding terms providing for individualized proceedings. Nor can we agree with the employees suggestion that the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) offers a conflicting command&It is this Courts duty to interpret Congresss statutes as a harmonious whole rather than at war with one another. And abiding that duty here leads to an unmistakable conclusion. The NLRA secures to employees rights to organize unions and bargain collectively, but it says nothing about how judges and arbitrators must try legal disputes that leave the workplace and enter the courtroom or arbitral forum. This Court has never read a right to class actions into the NLRAand for three quarters of a century neither did the National Labor Relations Board. Far from conflicting, the Arbitration Act and the NLRA have long enjoyed separate spheres of influence and neither permits this Court to declare the parties agreements unlawful. As noted by Defendant, the Epic Court found that the employees say we must rule for them anyway because of the deference this Court owes to an administrative agencys interpretation of the law. To be sure, the employees do not wish us to defer to the general counsels judgment in 2010 that the NLRA and the Arbitration Act coexist peaceably; they wish us to defer instead to the Boards 2012 opinion suggesting the NLRA displaces the Arbitration Act. No party to these cases has asked us to reconsider Chevron deference. But even under Chevrons terms, no deference is due. To show why, it suffices to outline just a few of the most obvious reasons. The Chevron Court justified deference on the premise that a statutory ambiguity represents an implicit delegation to an agency to interpret a statute which it administers. Here, though, the Board hasnt just sought to interpret its statute, the NLRA, in isolation; it has sought to interpret this statute in a way that limits the work of a second statute, the Arbitration Act. And&on no account might we agree that Congress implicitly delegated to an agency authority to address the meaning of a second statute it does not administer. ((Id. at pp. 519-520.) Based on the foregoing, the Court does not find that Plaintiff has shown that the fifth cause of action is not subject to the arbitration provision in the subject Agreement. Plaintiff also asserts that the misrepresentation claim is not included in the scope of the arbitration provision. (Oppn at p. 5:1-2.) In the fourth cause of action for misrepresentation, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants&represented to Plaintiff that the automobile was safe to drive, Defendants&represented to Plaintiff after each service attempt that the automobile was serviced properly and that there would be no further problems with the automobile, Defendants&represented to Plaintiff that Plaintiffs automobile did not qualify for repurchase, Defendants&represented to Plaintiff that Plaintiffs automobile was not subject to repurchase under the Lemon Law, and that Defendants&represented to Plaintiff that there was nothing they could do to assist Plaintiff other than offer to re-inspect the automobile. (Compl., ¶¶ 98-102.) Plaintiff alleges that [t]he representations made by Defendants&were false. (Compl., ¶ 104.) Plaintiff contends that he has alleged that Tesla sought to avoid warranty coverage by committing fraud and misrepresenting the terms of the warranty coverage to Plaintiff. In essence, Tesla avoided and attempted to deny the relationship between Plaintiff, as the subject consumer, and Tesla, as warrantor. Given this, Tesla cannot turn to an arbitration provision that seeks to cover any dispute arising out of or relating to any aspect of the relationship between you and Tesla&to compel arbitration of an [sic] claim arising from the fact that Tesla avoided its relationship with Plaintiff by way of fraud. (Oppn at p. 5:13-19, emphasis omitted.) The Court notes that Plaintiff does not cite any legal authority to support this proposition. Moreover, the Court does not see how the allegations of the Complaint show that Defendant purportedly attempted to deny the relationship between Plaintiff. (Oppn at p. 5:15.) The Court agrees with Defendant that the fourth cause of action for misrepresentation arise[s] out of and relate[s] to the relationship between the parties. (Mot. at p. 10:26-27.) Next, Plaintiff argues that [b]ecause the possibility of fraud was simply not foreseeable at the time the parties agreed to the arbitration provision, Tesla cannot force the provision to cover the unforeseeable claim. (Oppn at p. 6:25-27.) However, Plaintiff cites to non-binding federal authority in support of such assertion. (See Oppn at pp. 6:27-7:14.) Based on the foregoing, the Court does not find that Plaintiff has shown that the fourth cause of action is not subject to the arbitration provision in the subject Agreement. The Court finds that Defendant has established that an arbitration agreement exists and that it covers the causes of action asserted by Plaintiff in this action. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, Defendants motion to compel arbitration is granted. The entire action is stayed pending completion of arbitration of Plaintiffs arbitrable claims. The Court sets an arbitration completion status conference on July 17, 2025, at 10:00 a.m. in Dept. 50. The parties are ordered to file a joint report regarding the status of the arbitration five court days prior to the status conference, with a courtesy copy delivered directly to Department 50. Defendant is ordered to provide notice of this Order. DATED: July 17, 2024 ________________________________ Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court

Ruling

MATTHEW LUON, ET AL. VS AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION

Jul 16, 2024 |22NWCV01666

Case Number: 22NWCV01666 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Dept: C Matthew Luon, et al. vs American Honda Motor Co., Inc. Case No.: 22NWCV01666 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 @ 9:30 #3 Tentative Ruling Plaintiffs Matthew Luon and Lisa Kim Luons Motion to Compel Deposition and Production of Documents is GRANTED. Defendants Person Most Knowledgeable is ordered to sit for Deposition within 45 days, absent an agreement by the parties to a later date. The request for sanctions is DENIED. Plaintiff to give notice. Plaintiffs Matthew Luon and Lisa Kim Luon (collectively Plaintiffs) sue Defendant American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (Defendant) after leasing a 2021 Honda Pilot, identified by VIN No.: 5FNYF5H22MB027020 (the Subject Vehicle). Plaintiffs allege that nonconformities in the Subject Vehicle substantially impaired its use, value, and safety, and Defendants authorized service centers could not conform the Subject Vehicle to warranty within a reasonable number of presentations in violation of the Song-Beverly Warranty Act. Plaintiffs move to compel the deposition of Defendants Person Most Knowledgeable (PMK) and the production of documents. Pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.410, subdivision (a), [i]f, after service of a deposition notice, a party to the action& without having served a valid objection under Section 2025.410, fails to appear for examination, or to proceed with it, or to produce for inspection any document& described in the deposition notice, the party giving the notice may move for an order compelling the deponent's attendance and testimony, and the production for inspection of any document& described in the deposition notice. Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.410 provides that objections may be made to a deposition subpoena on the grounds that there are irregularities or errors in the process or form of the notice or subpoena. A motion made pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2024.450 must (1) set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the production for inspection of any document and (2) be accompanied by a meet and confer letter, or, when the deponent fails to attend the deposition and produce the documents described in the deposition notice,& by a declaration stating that the petitioner has contacted the deponent to inquire about the nonappearance. On April 13, 2023, Plaintiff noticed the deposition of Defendants PMK for May 3, 2023. (Castruita Decl., ¶ 4.) On April 27, 2023, Defendant served an objection to Plaintiffs notice of deposition on the grounds that Plaintiff failed to meet and confer. (Id., ¶ 5.) On May 5, 2023, Plaintiff served an amended notice of deposition for May 30, 2023. (Id., ¶ 21; Ex. 7.) On May 27, 2023, Defendant served an identical objection to Plaintiffs amended notice of deposition. (Id., ¶ 8.) On June 5, 2023, Plaintiff served a second amended notice of deposition for June 19, 2023. (Id., ¶ 9.) On June 14, 2023, Defendant served an identical objection to Plaintiffs second amended notice of deposition. (Id., ¶ 10.) On November 21, 2023, Plaintiff emailed Defendant for available dates before February 1, 2024. (Id., ¶ 12, Ex. 8.) Not having received a response, Plaintiff emailed Defendant on December 1, 2023 with three proposed dates and requested a response. (Id., ¶ 14, Ex. 9.) According to Plaintiffs Counsel, no response was received as of December 14, 2023, the date this motion was filed. In Opposition to the motion, Defendants counsel states that on December 8, 2023, she offered January 26, 2024, to Plaintiffs counsel to depose Defendants PMK in whatever case they chose. (Rein Decl., ¶ 12, Ex. K.) On December 10, 2023, Defendants counsel offered the additional date of January 11, 2024, to Plaintiffs counsel for the deposition of Defendants PMK in whatever case they chose. (Ibid.) Plaintiffs counsel made no subsequent attempts to meet and confer regarding the deposition of Defendants PMK. (Id., ¶ 14.) In Reply, Plaintiffs counsel states that the parties have agreed to depositions on July 22, 2024 and July 29, 2024. Accordingly Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Deposition is GRANTED. Defendant is ordered to produce its PMK for deposition within 45 days, absent an agreement by the parties to a later date. Sanctions CCP¿section¿2025.450(c) provides, (1) If a motion under subdivision (a) is granted, the court shall impose a monetary sanction . . . in favor of the party who noticed the deposition and against the deponent or the party with whom the deponent is affiliated, unless the court finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circ*mstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.¿ (Id.,, § 2025.450(c).)¿ Plaintiffs have noticed three depositions of Defendants PMK, and Defendant has objected to each one. With each objection, Defendant invited Plaintiffs to meet and confer regarding dates. While Plaintiffs correctly point out that there is no meet and confer requirement before noticing a deposition, it is common knowledge that the availability of PMKs for deposition is limited. Therefore, it should be of no surprise to Plaintiffs when the practice of unilaterally setting deposition dates, on just a few weeks notice, is met with negative results. Defendant states that it offered Plaintiffs law firm two deposition dates in January 2024 for cases of their choosing, but it appears this case was not identified as one of them. Under the circ*mstances here, no sanctions are warranted. Accordingly, the request for sanctions is DENIED. ¿

Ruling

CRISTIAN VALDIVIA VS GENERAL MOTORS LLC

Jul 18, 2024 |23STCV07396

Case Number: 23STCV07396 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: 48 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT CRISTIAN VALDIVIA, Plaintiff, vs. GENERAL MOTORS LLC, Defendant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) CASE NO.: 23STCV07396 [TENTATIVE] ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES Dept. 48 8:30 a.m. July 18, 2024 On November 1, 2023, Plaintiff Cristian Valdivia filed a motion to compel further responses to Request For Production, Set One from Defendant General Motors LLC. A. Plaintiff Did Not Comply With This Departments Procedures. For a motion to compel further, the moving party must meet and confer with the opposing party and file a Separate Statement or follow the Courts alternative method of outlining the disputes. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (b); California Rules of Court, rule 3.1345(b).) This Department requires the parties to follow the procedures outlined in Exhibit A of Department 48s Courtroom Information (available on the Courts website, www.lacourt.org) and file a joint statement. Plaintiff did not comply with these requirements. Instead, Plaintiff filed a 21-page motion, 75-page separate statement, and 107-page declaration with exhibits (most of which are irrelevant). B. Plaintiff Did Not Act Diligently, Meaningfully Meet and Confer, or Show Good Cause. A motion to compel further production of documents must include a meet and confer declaration. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (b)(2).) The meet and confer declaration must state facts showing a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented by the motion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2016.040.) Defendant provided responses on July 24, 2023, which Plaintiff deemed insufficient. (Ryu Decl. ¶ 21.) On September 6, 2023, Plaintiff attempted to meet and confer with Defendant by sending a detailed letter which outlined Defendants bad faith litigation antics, Defendants violations of the Civil Discovery Act, and why Plaintiff requires the requested documents to ready the case for trial. (Ryu Decl. ¶ 23.) According to Plaintiffs counsel, they attempt[ed] to reach Defendants counsel by telephone on at least 5 occasions from July through October of 2023. (Ryu Decl. ¶ 25.) According to Defendant, Plaintiff never attempted to contact Defendant by telephone in order to have a substantive conversation about their objections. (Pappas Decl. ¶ 5.) Plaintiffs counsel contends that they have made diligent efforts on behalf of Plaintiff to meet and confer with Defendants counsel. (Ryu Decl. ¶ 27.) The Court disagrees that this demonstrates a reasonable and good faith attempt to informally resolve the issues. Plaintiffs September 6, 2023 letter stated, For the reasons stated above and below, we request that you provide fully code-compliant, responses and further documents within 2 days of the date of this letter. This demand for full productionwithin only two daysis not a good faith attempt to resolve Defendants objections. Instead, the letter merely declares all objections meritless. According to Defendant, it is the same pro forma letter that Plaintiffs counsel recycles in every breach of warranty matter against GM after GM has served its responses to Plaintiffs counsels standard requests for production, which are the exact same in every case. (Pappas Decl. ¶ 5.) The failure to sufficiently meet and confer is also demonstrated by Plaintiffs failure to comply with Department 48s procedures for submission of a joint, not separate, statement. Although Plaintiffs motion is technically timely (see Code Civ. Proc., § 2024.020, subd. (a)), Plaintiff did not act diligently in seeking to compel further responses to discovery that was due one year agoespecially when this discovery is the first set of document production. The Final Status Conference is scheduled for only four days after this motion is heard, and trial is scheduled for August 5, 2024. With these looming deadlines, it is remarkable that Plaintiff did not further discuss the issues with Defendant. Furthermore, Plaintiffs boilerplate and repetitive separate statement does not set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (b)(1); see Digital Music News LLC v. Superior Court (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 216, 224 [To establish good cause, a discovery proponent must identify a disputed fact that is of consequence in the action and explain how the discovery sought will tend in reason to prove or disprove that fact or lead to other evidence that will tend to prove or disprove the fact.].) For these reasons, the motion to compel further is DENIED. Moving party to give notice. Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at SMCDEPT48@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit. If all parties in the case submit on the tentative ruling, no appearances before the Court are required unless a companion hearing (for example, a Case Management Conference) is also on calendar. Dated this 18th day of July 2024 Hon. Thomas D. Long Judge of the Superior Court

Ruling

BLANCA MAZARIEGOS, AN INDIVIDUAL VS GENERAL MOTORS, LLC, A DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY

Jul 19, 2024 |22STCV33860

Case Number: 22STCV33860 Hearing Date: July 19, 2024 Dept: 51 Tentative Ruling Judge Upinder S. Kalra, Department 51 HEARING DATE: July 19, 2024 CASE NAME: Blanca Mazariegos v. General Motors LLC CASE NO.: 22STCV33860 MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Blanca Mazariegos RESPONDING PARTY(S): Defendant General Motors LLC REQUESTED RELIEF: 1. An Order Awarding Attorneys Fees of $31,875.00 2. An Order Awarding Costs of $3,433.20 TENTATIVE RULING: The fee motion is granted in part. STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS: On October 19, 2022, Plaintiff Blanca Mazariegos (Plaintiff) filed a Complaint against Defendant General Motors, LLC (Defendant) with two causes of action for: (1) Breach of Implied Warranty of Merchantability under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act; and (2) Breach of Express Warranty under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. The Complaint concerns Plaintiffs purchase of a 2022 Chevrolet Silverado, VIN 1GCPWBEK2NZ117813. On November 21, 2022, Defendant filed an Answer. On March 28, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Settlement. On April 22, 2024, Plaintiff filed a motion for attorneys fees and costs. On April 23, 2024, Plaintiff filed an amended motion. On May 31, 2024, Defendant filed an opposition. On June 6, 2024, Plaintiff filed a reply. LEGAL STANDARD: A prevailing buyer in an action under Song-Beverly shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorneys fees based on actual time expended, determined by the Court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action. (Civ. Code, § 1794(d).) By permitting buyers who prevail under Song-Beverly to recover their attorneys fees, our Legislature has provided injured consumers strong encouragement to seek legal redress in a situation in which a lawsuit might not otherwise have been economically feasible. (Murillo v. Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 985, 994.) The prevailing party has the burden of showing that the requested attorney fees are reasonable. (Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 785, 817.) The party seeking attorney fees is not necessarily entitled to the compensation of the value of attorney services according to [his or her] own notion or to the full extent claimed . . . . (Levy v. Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Inc. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 807, 816.) If the time expended or the monetary charge being made for the time expended are not reasonable under all circ*mstances, then the court must take this into account and award fees in a lesser amount. (Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor America (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 99, 104.) A calculation of attorneys fees for a Song-Beverly action begins with the lodestar approach, under which the Court fixes the lodestar at the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate. (Margolin v. Regional Planning Com. (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 999, 1004-1005.) California courts have consistently held that a computation of time spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a determination of an appropriate attorneys fee award. (Ibid.) It is appropriate for a trial court to reduce a fee award based on its reasonable determination that a routine, non-complex case was overstaffed to a degree that significant inefficiencies and inflated fees resulted. (Morris v. Hyundai Motor America (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 24, 39.) It is also appropriate to reduce a fee award based on inefficient or duplicative efforts in the billing record. (Id. at p. 38.) However, the analysis must be reasonably specific and cannot rely on general notions about the fairness of the fee award. (Kerkeles v. City of San Jose (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 88, 102.) Moreover, in conducting the analysis, courts are not permitted to tie any reductions in the fee award to some proportion of the buyers damages recovery. (Warren v. Kia Motors America, Inc. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 24, 39.) The lodestar figure may also be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided. (Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49; PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.App.4th 1084, 1095.) The factors considered in determining the modification of the lodestar include the nature and difficulty of the litigation, the amount of money involved, the skill required and employed to handle the case, the attention given, the success or failure,¿and other circ*mstances in the case. (EnPalm, LLC v.¿Teitler¿Family Trust¿(2008) 162 Cal. App. 4th 770, 774 (emphasis in original).) A negative modifier was appropriate when duplicative work had been performed. (Thayer v. Wells Fargo Bank,¿N.A.¿(2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 819.)¿ ANALYSIS: Plaintiff requests $31,875.00 in attorneys fees and $3,433.20 in costs for a total of $35,308.20. Defendant requests that the court reduce the attorneys fees to $12,863.50 and costs to $2,523.25. Four attorneys were involved at various junctures in this case. (Barry Decl., ¶ 17.) C. Richard Lara was the handling attorney ($350 hourly rate). (Barry Decl., ¶ 17; Lara Decl., ¶ 6.) The involvement of David N. Barry ($600 hourly rate before 3/31/23, $625 thereafter) became necessary given the facts and complexity of the case, the litigation posture of Defense, and given this case was approaching trial. (Barry Decl., ¶¶ 17, 22.) Otis R. Hayes ($500 hourly rate) and Jeramy D. Templin ($350 hourly rate) also worked on the case. (Hayes Decl., ¶ 5; Templin Decl., ¶ 7.) Prevailing Party Here, the parties entered a Settlement Agreement that provided for GM to pay Plaintiff $54,000.00, inclusive of loan payoff, representing a full repurchase in exchange for the Subject Vehicle; that Plaintiff is the prevailing party; and that attorneys fees, costs, and expenses incurred by Plaintiff would be paid in compliance with Civil Code § 1794(d) by way of motion. (Barry Decl., Exh. 4.) Lodestar Fees The lodestar method looks at the time spent on a matter multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate. (Serrano, supra 20 Cal.3d at 49). The two-step process begins with the lodestar method, which is the time spent on the matter multiple by the hourly rate. After the lodestar method, the second step is determining whether a multiplier should be applied. The factors that Courts look at to determine if a multiplier is reasonable are: 1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132). In determining hourly rates, the court must look to the prevailing market rates in the relevant community. (Bell v. Clackamas County¿(9th Cir.2003) 341 F.3d 858, 868.) The rates of comparable attorneys in the forum district are usually used. (See¿Gates v. Deukmejian¿(9th Cir.1992) 987 F.2d 1392, 1405.) In making its calculation, the court should also consider the experience, skill, and reputation of the attorney requesting fees. (Heritage Pacific Financial, LLC v. Monroy¿(2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 1009.) Plaintiffs argue the hourly rates are reasonable. Here, the requested hourly rates are as follows according to the Motion, p. 14: · David N. Barry: 16.4 hours at $675/hour[1] · Otis R. Hayes: 8.5 hours at $500/hour · Brian Kim: 2.8 hours at $350/hour · C. Richard Lara: 41.9 hours at $350/hour · Jeramy D. Templin: 2.6 hours at $350/hour The court finds that these hourly rates are reasonable based on the hourly rate of similarly situated attorneys in the Los Angeles area. Based on the Laffey Matrix, attorneys with similar years of experience as Plaintiffs counsel as identified above have comparable, if not a higher hourly rate. However, billing at a high rate comes with the expectation that the attorney also works in an efficient manner that reflects the premium paid for his or her services. The court considers this fact in addressing the reasonableness of the hours expended, below. Thus, the hourly rates are appropriate. Reasonableness of Hours Billed To determine if the requested amount is reasonable, California courts utilize the lodestar method. The two-step process begins with the lodestar method, which is the time spent on the matter multiple by the hourly rate. After the lodestar method, the second step is determining whether a multiplier should be applied. The factors that Courts look at to determine if a multiplier is reasonable are: 1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.) Although a verified fee bill is prima facie evidence the costs, expenses and services listed were necessarily incurred, (Hadley v. Krepel (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 677, 682), ultimately, Counsel still has the burden to demonstrate the reasonableness of charges. (Mikhaeilpoor, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at p. 247.) The court has reviewed the fee bill submitted by Counsel and the proposed reductions by Defendant. Plaintiffs contend that the billable hours are reasonable. The total amount billed is 72.2 hours. While Plaintiff is to be commended for not billing for all work and assigning much of the work to a junior associate billing at $350 per hour, the hours billed for this unremarkable lemon law case with no dispositive motions and very little other motion work seems high. Upon further review of the billing, the Court questioned the reasonableness of some billing entries. Pleadings, Motions, & Discovery Boilerplate filings serve a useful purpose. They increase productivity by allowing for simple edits to existing documents. Thus, utilizing templates is to be commended when it results in efficiency. However, if templates are employed but attorneys are still billing significant time to make minor changes, such use of legal resources is unwarranted and any such bill is unreasonable, particularly if the attorney is billing at a high hourly rate. (Mikhaeilpoor, supra, at p. 250.) Here, the court found instances where the time spent for minor cut and paste edits to templates was unreasonable. i. Discovery Requests to Defendant The Court reviewed the time spend for drafting discovery requests, reviewing discovery, responding to discovery, a motion to compel a deposition, preparing meet and confer letters, drafting an IDC statement and drafting memos to file. Drafting discovery motions and meet and confer letters, and memos to file for a sophisticated, highly practiced Lemon Law firm is template or clerical work. Responding and reviewing discovery is similar to cookie cutter work. An IDC Statement is to be a memorandum measured in pages that is supposed to concisely state the issue. The Court reviewed the IDC statement in this case. It could not have reasonably taken 3.5 hours of attorney time to write. The Court is mindful of the purpose of an IDC. It is supposed to save costs and not generate 3.5 hours of billable time. Accordingly, these fees are unreasonable. ii. Fee motion Counsel billed 12.2 hors for a fee motion. This looks like many that this Court has reviewed. It is simply an accounting and a template. A seasoned Lemon Law firm should spend no more than 7 hours on this motion in this matter. iii. Travel Time Counsel billed for 3.3 hours totaling $1,410 traveling to and from court. This Court agrees that this charges are unreasonable on their face. As such, the Court reduces the requested lodestar by $8,410. In all other respects, the billings are proper and reasonable. To be clear, the Court finds the reasonable amount of fees, based upon its experience and knowledge of this type of litigation, the lack of novelty and complexity of this case, and the professed specialization of Plaintiffs counsel is $23,465. Costs: Plaintiffs request $3,433.20 in costs and expenses. The memorandum of Costs is attached to the Barry Decl. as Exhibit 7.[2] Items on a verified cost bill are prima facie evidence the costs, expenses and services listed were necessarily incurred, and when they are properly challenged the burden of proof shifts to the party claiming them as costs. (Hadley, supra, 167 Cal.App.3d at 682). Under CCP § 1794(d) If the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney's fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action. Defendant argues that the Court should reduce the requested amount by $909.15. This is based on parking and mileage, filing fees, future estimated court reporter fees, and future jury fees. The requested costs are appropriate. Moreover, while the reporter charge was estimated at the first hearing, the charge has been incurred as of this, the subsequent hearing. Thus, as of today, the $550 for a future hearing is an incurred cost However, the Court agrees that parking of 59.80 for attending the CMC and Post-Mediation status Conference was unnecessary. These were hardly critical appearances that required in person appearance as opposed to appearing remotely, which would have generated no costs. Thus, the Court reduces the costs by $59.80. CONCLUSION: For the foregoing reasons, the Court decides the pending motion as follows: Motion for Attorneys Fees is GRANTED, in the amount of $23,465 and costs in the amount of $3,373.40 for a total of $26,838.40 payable within 45 days of service of this order. Moving party is to give notice. IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: July 16, 2024 __________________________________ Upinder S. Kalra Judge of the Superior Court [1]The Court will note, however, that the hourly rate for Mr. Barry requested in the motion is higher than the hourly rate Mr. Barry requests in his declaration. Barry Decl., ¶ 22: Please note, I am only seeking an hourly rate of $600 for services rendered after January 13 1, 2022 through March 31, 2023. I am only seeking an hourly rate of $625 for services rendered 14 after April 1, 2023.] [2]Plaintiff contends that Defendant failed to bring a Motion to Tax Costs so the challenges should be overruled. The Court notes that Plaintiff, for their part, did not file a separate memorandum of costs but rather only attached cost as an Exhibit to this fee motion. As such, the time to file a Motion to Tax Costs may not have even commenced since the Costs Memorandum has yet to be filed.

Ruling

STEVEN SANCHEZ VS FORD MOTOR COMPANY, A DELAWARE CORPORATION, ET AL.

Jul 16, 2024 |23NWCV02902

Case Number: 23NWCV02902 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Dept: C Steven Sanchez vs Ford Motor Company, et al. Case No.: 23NWCV02902 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 at 10:30 a.m. #8 Tentative Ruling Defendant Ford Motor Companys Demurrer to the First, Second, and Third Causes of Action is SUSTAINED with 20 days leave to amend. Defendant Ken Grody Fords Demurrer to the Fourth Cause of Action is SUSTAINED without leave to amend. Defendants to give notice. Background This lemon law action was filed on September 13, 2023 by Plaintiff Steven Sanchez (Plaintiff) against Defendants Ford Motor Company and Ken Grody Ford Buena Park (collectively Defendants) alleging four causes of action: (1) Violation of Song-Beverly Act-Breach of Express Warranty; (2) Violation of Song-Beverly Act- Breach of Implied Warranty; (3) Violation of Song-Beverly Act Section 1793.2; (4) Negligent Repair. Defendant Ford Motor Company demurs to the First through Third Causes of Action on the grounds that the Song-Beverly Act does not extend warranties for used vehicles to original manufacturers. Defendant Ken Grody demurs to the Fourth Cause of Action on the grounds that Plaintiff fails to allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action. Legal Standard A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the pleading states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (CCP § 430.10(e); Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal. App. 4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal. App. 4th 1216, 1228.) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal. App. 3d 902, 905.)¿ The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action. (Hahn, 147 Cal.App.4th at 747.) The court treats the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.) The Song-Beverly Causes of Action Ford argues that the first through third causes of action fail because Plaintiff bought a used car, not a new car. Civ. Code §1793.22 (e) defines what New Motor Vehicle means for purposes of the Song-Beverly Act, including a dealer-owned vehicle and a demonstrator or other motor vehicle sold with a manufacturers new car warranty. (CCP § 1793.22(e)(2).)¿Ford cites Rodriguez v. FCA US LLC (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 209, 218, review granted July 13, 2022, S274625. Rodriguez is cited here for its persuasive value.¿¿ Rodriguez parses the meaning of the words, or other motor vehicle sold with a manufacturers new car warranty, to determine whether this covers the sale of previously owned vehicles with some balance remaining on the manufacturers express warranty. In a well-reasoned and persuasive opinion, Rodriguez concludes it does not. Instead, it holds that demonstrators and dealer-owned vehicles are a narrow class of basically new vehicles that have never been previously sold to a consumer and they come with full express warranties. Rodriguez, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th 209 at 220, bolding added. [W]e conclude the phrase other motor vehicle sold with a manufacturers new car warranty unambiguously refers to cars that come with a new or full express warranty. (Id. at 222.)¿ Rodriguez distinguishes Jensen v. BMW of North America, Inc. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 112, a case where the consumer was provided with the manufacturers full new car warranty. While the holding of Jensen is that cars sold with a balance remaining on the manufacturers new motor vehicle warranty are new motor vehicles within the meaning of Civ. Code §1793.22, Rodriguez notes that Jensen was not required to decide the issue since the subject vehicle there was sold with a full new car warranty. It notes that other cases, including Dagher v. Ford Motor Co. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 905, have also found it appropriate to limit Jensen to the facts before it. For example, Kiluk v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 334, 340, expressed having reservations about applying Jensen but found it did not have to under the particular facts before it. Here, Plaintiffs 2019 Ford F-150 was purchased used with 30,031 miles on it. (Lally Decl., ¶ 2, Ex. A) Plaintiff does not allege he purchased this car with a new car warranty. (Complaint ¶ 9.) In his opposition, Plaintiff urges the Court to follow the recently decided case of Stiles v. Kia Motors America, Inc. (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 913. Stiles held that a previously owned motor vehicle purchased with the manufacturers new car warranty still in effect is a new motor vehicle eligible for the replace and refund remedy under the Song-Beverly Act. Stiles v. Kia Motors, Inc, supra, at 919. However, Plaintiff cannot rely upon Stiles because the Complaint, as currently pled, does not allege that Plaintiffs vehicle had remaining miles on the manufacturers written warranty. Because the car at issue is a used car and there is no allegation of any remaining miles on the manufactures written warranty the Demurrer to the First, Second and Third Causes of Action is SUSTAINED with 20 days leave to amend. Negligent Repair Cause of Action Defendant Ken Grody Ford demurs to the fourth cause of action on grounds that the cause of action is barred by the economic loss rule, and that Plaintiffs fail to plead damages. Plaintiffs lack of opposition to this argument is deemed to be a concession. Accordingly, the Demurrer to the Fourth Cause of Action is SUSTAINED without leave to amend.

Ruling

VIRGINIA DIAZ, ET AL. VS FORD MOTOR COMPANY, A DELAWARE CORPORATION, ET AL.

Jul 17, 2024 |23STCV21150

Case Number: 23STCV21150 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Dept: 71 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles DEPARTMENT 71 TENTATIVE RULING VIRGINIA DIAZ, et al., vs. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, et al. Case No.: 23STCV21150 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Defendants Ford Motor Companys and Bob Wondries Fords demurrer to Plaintiffs Virginia Diazs and Juan Diazs first amended complaint is sustained as to the 2nd cause of action without leave to amend. Defendant Ford Motor Company (Ford) (Defendant) demurs to Plaintiffs Virginia Diazs (Virginia) and Juan Diazs (Juan) (collectively, Plaintiffs) first amended complaint (FAC). (Notice of Demurrer, pg. 1.) Meet and Confer Before filing a demurrer, the moving party must meet and confer in person, by telephone, or by video conference with the party who filed the pleading to attempt to reach an agreement that would resolve the objections to the pleading and obviate the need for filing the demurrer. (C.C.P. §430.41, emphasis added.) Defendants counsel declares that on February 28, 2024, counsel for Defendant sent Plaintiffs counsel a meet and confer email to discuss the legal basis for Defendants demurrer, and Plaintiffs counsel did not respond. (Decl. of Patel ¶3.) Defendants counsels declaration fails to demonstrate she attempted to meet and confer in person, by telephone, or by video conference with Plaintiffs counsel. However, the failure to sufficiently meet and confer is not grounds to overrule or sustain a demurrer. (C.C.P. §430.41(a)(4); Dumas v. Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 348, 355; Olson v. Hornbrook Community Services District (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 502, 515.) Accordingly, the Court will consider Defendants demurrer. Background Plaintiffs filed their initial Complaint on September 1, 2023, against Defendant Ford and Non-moving Defendant Bob Wondries Motors dba Bob Wondries Ford (Bob Wondries) (collectively, Defendants) alleging three causes of action: (1) violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act Civil Code §§1790 et seq. (Song-Beverly)- breach of express warranty [against Ford]; (2) fraudulent inducement- concealment [against Ford]; and (3) negligent repair [against Bob Wondries]. Plaintiffs causes of action arise from their December 13, 2017, purchase of a new 2018 Ford Mustang (Subject Vehicle) and a transmission defect in the Subject Vehicle. (See Complaint.) On January 12, 2024, this Court sustained Defendants demurrer to Plaintiffs Complaint as to the 2nd and 3rd causes of action with 20 days leave to amend and overruled Defendants demurrer to the 1st cause of action. (1/12/24 Minute Order, pg. 7.) Plaintiffs filed the operative FAC against Defendants on February 1, 2024, alleging the same three causes of action. Ford filed the instant demurrer on April 4, 2024. Plaintiffs filed their opposition on May 3, 2024. Defendants filed their reply on May 9, 2024. Summary of Demurrer Ford demurs to the 2nd cause of action for fraudulent inducement-concealment on the basis the claim still fails to plead essential elements to state the claim and is barred by the economic loss rule as Plaintiffs failed correct any of the pleading deficiencies in their initial Complaint. (Demurrer, pg. 2; C.C.P. §430.10(e).) Legal Standard [A] demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint. (Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.) A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (See Donabedian v. Mercury Insurance Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994 [in ruling on a demurrer, a court may not consider declarations, matters not subject to judicial notice, or documents not accepted for the truth of their contents].) For purposes of ruling on a demurrer, all facts pleaded in a complaint are assumed to be true, but the reviewing court does not assume the truth of conclusions of law. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital District (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.) Failure to State a Claim Fraudulent Concealment (2nd COA) The required elements for fraudulent concealment are: (1) concealment or suppression of a material fact; (2) by a defendant with a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff; (3) the defendant intended to defraud the plaintiff by intentionally concealing or suppressing the fact; (4) the plaintiff was unaware of the fact and would not have acted as he or she did if he or she had known of the concealed or suppressed fact; and (5) plaintiff sustained damage as a result of the concealment or suppression of the fact. (See Bank of America Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 862, 870; Civ. Code §1710(3); CACI 1901.) The rule of specificity of pleading is only intended for affirmative fraud cases not fraud by concealment. (See Alfaro v. Community Housing Improvement Systems & Planning Association, Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1356, 1384.) Plaintiffs failed to plead with sufficient particularity what representations Ford made to these particular Plaintiffs regarding the Transmission Defect that these Plaintiffs relied on in purchasing the Subject Vehicle. Plaintiffs do not plead that Ford made any specific representations directly to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs do not allege any direct contact with Ford before purchasing the Subject Vehicle where representations regarding the Transmission Defect at issue should or could have been revealed. Merely alleging that Ford omitted facts about an alleged Transmission Defect in its general advertisem*nts to an unknown audience cannot establish: (1) knowledge of a particular defect in a particular vehicle, or (2) intent to conceal this particular knowledge from these particular Plaintiffs. (See Tenzer v. Superscope, Inc. (1985) 39 Cal. 3d 18, 30 [something more than nonperformance is required to prove the defendants intent not to perform his promise].) Plaintiffs interactions with a third-party dealership, i.e. statements made during the sales process are not pled as specific to the Transmission Defect and would amount to standard sales puffery that courts have repeatedly held to be non-actionable anyway. (Hauter v. Zogarts (1975) 14 Cal. 3d 104, 111 [statements of opinion, or puffing, are non-actionable].) Further, even if Plaintiffs claim to have relied on representations, misstatements, or omissions by an authorized dealer, such conduct is not attributable to Ford or actionable against Ford. Plaintiffs do not claim there were ever representations by Defendant or a dealership about the transmission of the Subject Vehicle on which they relied. Therefore, the concealed or omitted factthe Transmission defectcannot be contrary to a [material] representation actually made by the defendant. (Gutierrez v. Carmax Auto Superstores California (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1234, 1258.) Additionally, Plaintiffs improperly rely on the issuance of TSBs, as a TSB does not establish knowledge of the alleged defect. (See American Honda Motor Co., Inc. v. Superior Court (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1378 [A TSB is not and cannot fairly be construed by a trial court as an admission of a design or other defect, because TSBs are routinely issued to dealers to help diagnose and repair typical complaints.].) As Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged Fords exclusive knowledge and active concealment of the engine defects, Plaintiffs have also failed to show Defendant had a duty to disclose to Plaintiffs. (See Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. Insomniac, Inc. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 803, 831 [detailing the ways in which a fiduciary duty may arise].) Further, the economic loss rule bars Plaintiffs fraud claim. The California Supreme Court in Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc. v. Dana Corp. limited its holding permitting fraud claims to proceed in contract actions to a defendants affirmative misrepresentations on which Plaintiffs rely, and which expose Plaintiffs to liability for personal damages independent of the Plaintiffs economic loss. (Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc. v. Dana Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 979, 993.) Here, Plaintiffs fraud claim is based on an alleged fraudulent omission rather than affirmative misrepresentation, seeks purely economic losses, and derives from Fords alleged breach of warranty. There are no allegations of physical damage to Plaintiffs property beyond the defective vehicle itself, or that personal injury accompanied such losses. There are no allegations of intentional acts by Ford to fit within Robinsons narrow exception to the economic loss rule for intentional acts. (Robinson, 34 Cal.4th at pg. 993.) Even if fraudulent inducement based on concealment claims are excepted from the economic loss rule, the FAC fails to plead fraudulent inducement to fall within Robinsons fraudulent inducement exception as there is no allegation that Ford did not intend to honor its warranty obligations when Plaintiffs purchased the vehicle. (See id. at pgs. 989-990 [limiting four exceptions to the traditional contract remedy restrictions including where the contract was fraudulently induced]; Food Safety Services v. Eco Safe Systems USA, Inc. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1118, 1131 [stating to establish a claim of fraudulent inducement, one must show that the defendant did not intend to honor its contractual promises when they were made].) Here, there is no allegation that Ford did not intend to honor its contractual promises when Plaintiffs entered into the warranty contract to state an inducement claim. The FAC reflects that the gravamen of Plaintiffs fraud claim is one and the same as their breach of warranty claim as it admits that Plaintiffs fraud claim is based on Fords alleged non-performance under the warranty contract as Plaintiffs purport to have only discovered Fords alleged wrongful conduct shortly before the filing of the complaint, as the Vehicle continued to exhibit symptoms of defects following FMCs unsuccessful attempts to repair them. (FAC ¶8.) Therefore, Plaintiffs fraud claim is barred by the economic loss rule. Accordingly, Fords demurrer to Plaintiffs 2nd cause of action is sustained without leave to amend. Conclusion Fords demurrer to Plaintiffs 2nd cause of action is sustained without leave to amend. Moving Party to give notice. Dated: July _____, 2024 Hon. Daniel M. Crowley Judge of the Superior Court

Ruling

WALTER BANEGGAS VS JAGUAR LAND ROVER NORTH AMERICA, LLC, A DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, ET AL.

Jul 17, 2024 |24VECV00215

Case Number: 24VECV00215 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Dept: W WALTER BANEGGAS vs JAGUAR LAND ROVER NORTH AMERICA, LLC, et al. PLAINTIFFS MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFFS FIRST SET OF SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES AND REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS Date of Hearing: July 17, 2024 Trial Date: None set. Department: W Case No.: 24VECV00215 Moving Party: Plaintiff Walter Baneggas Responding Party: Defendant Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC Meet and Confer: Yes. (Thomas decl. ¶¶7-11.) BACKGROUND This is a lemon law action. On January 17, 2023, Plaintiff Walter Baneggas filed a complaint against Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC, Galpin Jaguar Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. dba Jaguar Van Nuys/Land Rover Van Nuys for Violation of Song-Beverly Act Breach of Express Warranty. Plaintiff purchased a 2018 Lan Rover Range Rover Velar. Plaintiff alleges they delivered the vehicle to an authorized repair facility for nonconformities, but Defendants were unable to conform the subject vehicle to the applicable express warranty after a reasonable number of repair attempts. [Tentative] Ruling Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Further Responses to Plaintiffs First Set of Special Interrogatories and Request for Sanctions is GRANTED, in part. discussion Plaintiff Baneggas moves the court for an order compelling further responses to Plaintiffs first set of Special Interrogatories and monetary sanctions in the amount of $3,660.00 against Defendant Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC and its attorney of record, Turner Henningsen Wolf and Vandenburg LLP. On receipt of a response to interrogatories, the propounding party may move for an order compelling a further response if the propounding party deems that any of the following apply: (1) An answer to a particular interrogatory is evasive or incomplete. (2) An exercise of the option to produce documents under Section 2030.230 is unwarranted or the required specification of those documents is inadequate. (3) An objection to an interrogatory is without merit or too general.¿ (CCP § 2030.300(a).)¿ A motion under subdivision (a) [of CCP § 2030.300] shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.¿ (CCP § 2030.300(b).)¿ In addition, a separate statement is required.¿ (California Rules of Court (CRC) Rule 3.1345(a)(2).) Plaintiff moves for further responses to Plaintiffs special interrogatories, set one. Specifically, in response to Special Interrogatories 1-3, 8-9, 17 and 42 Defendant referenced by name certain documents it claimed were produced concurrently herewith. However, Defendant produced no documents. In Response to Special Interrogatories 10-16[1] and 19-20 Defendant referred Plaintiff to its response to Form Interrogatory 15.1. Lastly, in response to Special Interrogatories 18, 21-27, 29-41 and 43-48, Defendant asserted only objections. In opposition, JLRNA argues the motion was not served with sufficient notice because Plaintiff forgot to take into consideration the additional two court days required by Code of Civil Procedure section 1010.6. JLRNA contends the motion should be denied on this basis alone and if not, requests this court reschedule the hearing to a later time with sufficient amount of notice. The court finds JLRNA was not prejudiced by the late filing. The filing was late by two days and JLRNA was able to oppose the motion on the merits despite forgetting to properly calendar their opposition. JLRNA next argues the motion is procedurally defective because what Plaintiff really seeks is a production of documents, not further responses. The court finds no grounds to deny the motion on the grounds of mislabeling. Plaintiff provided all the necessary information for a motion to compel compliance and JLRNA was able to oppose the motion on that basis. JLRNA lastly argues Plaintiff has failed to show good cause for the requested documents or information. The court disagrees. As for 18, 21-23, 27-26, 31 and 43-44, the court finds JLRNAs policies and procedures relevant. Each is limited to the Song-Beverly Act. JLRNA may seek a protective order for the policies and procedures. The court also finds Special Interrogatories 24-25, 29-30 and 40-41 properly seek information about Defendants training and practices by which it does or does not comply with the Song-Beverly Act. The identity of witnesses is relevant to Plaintiffs claims. The court notes JLRNAs response Discovery is continuing, and JLRNA reserves the right to supplement its response based upon further investigation is not necessarily improper. However, if some information is present, it should be provided now. If new information does come up during JLRNAs ongoing investigation, JLRNAs may supplement its answers. If after reasonable inquiry, JLRNA cannot answer the request, JRLNA must state so. The court notes both parties reference No. 32-39 and 45-48 but these interrogatories are not in the separate statement and this court cannot properly evaluate them. Accordingly, Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Further Responses to Plaintiffs First Set of Special Interrogatories is GRANTED, in part. The request for sanctions in the amount of $3,660.00 is DENIED as both parties positions were substantially justified. .

Ruling

FRANCISCO MEDINA RAMIREZ VS MERCEDEZ-BENZ USA, LLC, A DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, ET AL.

Jul 18, 2024 |24LBCV00216

Case Number: 24LBCV00216 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: S25 Background On February 1, 2024, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (Defendant Mercedes), Calibers Motors, Inc, and Does 1 to 10, alleging violations of the Song-Beverely Consumer Warranty Act (SBA) and negligent repair. Plaintiff alleges that on or about May 5, 2022, he purchased a 2022 Mercedes-Benz Metris, VIN No.: W1YV0BEY7N3960756 (Subject Vehicle) (Compl., ¶ 9.) Plaintiff alleges he presented the Subject Vehicle approximately four times for jerking upon shifting gears and/or delayed and rough gear shifts. Plaintiff alleges the Subject Vehicle was delivered to him with serious defects and nonconformities to warranty. (Compl., ¶¶ 11-17.) Plaintiff insists all causes of action arise out of warranty and repair obligations of Defendant Mercedes as the warranty was issued by Defendant Mercedes and not the selling dealership. Defendant Mercedes now brings this motion to compel to arbitration. Request for Judicial Notice Defendant Mercedess Request for Judicial Notice and Plaintiff Requests for Judicial Notice are granted pursuant to Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d). Evidentiary Objections Plaintiffs evidentiary objection to the Declaration of Ali Ameripour is Overruled. Legal Standards The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) creates a general presumption in favor of arbitration and requires the enforcement of a written agreement to arbitrate. (Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. (1961) 500 U.S. 20, 24-25.) A defendant only needs to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that an agreement to arbitrate the plaintiffs claims exist. (See, e.g., Condee v. Longwood Mgmt. Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 218-219.) To satisfy this burden, a defendant may simply supply a copy of the agreement or recite its terms in its petition to compel arbitration. (Id. at p. 219.) With the FAA, 9 U.S.C. §1, et seq., Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the States to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration. (Southland Corp. v. Keating (1984) 465 U.S. 1, 10.) Notably, the burden is on the party opposing arbitration to proffer evidence demonstrating that such an agreement is invalid. (See, e.g., Green Treen Fin. Corp. v. Randolph (2000) 531 U.S. 79, 91-92.) Enforceability of an arbitration agreement is determined pursuant to the FAA, which requires that: (1) parties have entered into a written arbitration agreement, (2) there exists an independent basis for federal jurisdiction, and (3) the underlying transaction involves interstate commerce. (Cosmotek Mumessillik Ve Ticaret Ltd Sirkketi v. Cosmotek USA, Inc. (D.Conn.1996) 942 21 F.Supp. 757, 759.) If the transaction between the parties does not implicate interstate commerce, the court applies the forum states substantive laws. (Howard Fields & Associates v. Grand Wailea Co. (D.Hawaii 1993) 848 F.Supp. 890, 893.) California law reflects a strong public policy in favor of arbitration as a relatively quick and inexpensive method for resolving disputes. To further that policy, Code of Civil Procedure, section 1281.2 requires a trial court to enforce a written arbitration agreement unless one of three limited exceptions applies. Those statutory exceptions arise where (1) a party waives the right to arbitration; (2) grounds exist for revoking the arbitration agreement; and (3) pending litigation with a third party creates the possibility of conflicting rulings on common factual or legal issues. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2; Acquire II, Ltd. v. Colton Real Estate Group (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 959, 967.) Similarly, public policy under federal law favors arbitration and the fundamental principle that arbitration is a matter of contract and that courts must place arbitration agreements on an equal footing with other contracts and enforce them according to their terms. (AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (2011) 56 U.S. 333, 339.) A motion to compel arbitration or stay proceedings must state verbatim the provisions providing for arbitration or must have a copy of them attached. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1330.) Arbitration Provision Defendant moves to compel arbitration pursuant to the Retail Installment Sales Contract (RISC) entered into with the dealership and has provided the verbatim provisions providing for arbitration. (RISC, Exhibit 2 to Decl. of Ali Ameripour). The arbitration provision upon which defendant relies appears in the RISC and provides as follows: 1. EITHER YOU OR WE MAY CHOOSE TO HAVE ANY DISPUTE BETWEEN US DECIDED BY ARBITRATION AND NOT IN COURT OR BY JURY TRIAL. 2. IF A DISPUTE IS ARBITRATED, YOU WILL GIVE UP YOUR RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE AS A CLASS REPRESENTATIVE OR CLASS MEMBER ON ANY CLASS CLAIM YOU MAY HAVE AGAINST US INCLUDING ANY RIGHT TO CLASS ARBITRATION OR ANY CONSOLIDATION OF INDIVIDUAL ARBITRATIONS. 3. DISCOVERY AND RIGHTS TO APPEAL IN ARBITRATION ARE GENERALLY MORE LIMITED THAN IN A LAWSUIT, AND OTHER RIGHTS THAT YOU AND WE WOULD HAVE IN COURT MAY NOT BE AVAILABLE IN ARBITRATION. The arbitration agreement further states: Any claim or dispute, whether in contract, tort, statute or otherwise including the interpretation and scope of this Arbitration Provision, and the arbitrability of the claim or dispute), between you and us or our employees, agents, successors or assigns, which arises out of or relates to your credit application, purchase or condition of this vehicle, this contract or any resulting transaction or relationship (including any such relationship with third parties who do not sign this contract) shall, at your or our election, be resolved by neutral, binding arbitration and not by a court action [&.] Any arbitration under this Arbitration Provision shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 1 et. seq.) and not by any state law concerning arbitration. (RISC, Ameripour Decl., Exh. 2, p. 5.) Equitable Estoppel and Third-Party Beneficiary Defendant is not a signatory of the RISC. Defendant argues that even though it's a non-signatory to the agreement, it nonetheless has standing to enforce the arbitration agreement under the doctrine of equitable estoppel and/or on the grounds of being a third-party beneficiary to the sales agreement. A nonsignatory may enforce an arbitration clause on grounds of equitable estoppel when the claims against the nonsignatory are dependent upon, or founded in and inextricably intertwined with, the obligations imposed by the agreement containing the arbitration clause. (Goldman v. KPMG LLP (2009) 173 Cal. App. 4th 209, 217-218; Marenco v. DirectTV LLC (2015) 233 Cal. App. 4th 1409, 1419-1420.) Estoppel may also apply when someone attempts to exploit her own wrong. (Hernandez v. Meridian Management Services, LLC (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1214, 1219.) Defendant Mercedes urges the court to follow the 3rd District Court of Appeals holding in Felisalda v. FCA US LLC (2020) 53 Cal. App. 5th 486. In Felisalda, the appellate court held: The Felisildas claim against FCA directly relates to the condition of the vehicle that they allege to have violated warranties they received as a consequence of the sales contract. Because the Felisildas expressly agreed to arbitrate claims arising out of the condition of the vehicle even against third party nonsignatories to the sales contract they are estopped from refusing to arbitrate their claim against FCA. Consequently, the trial court properly ordered the Felisildas to arbitrate their claim against FCA. Felisilda, supra, 53 Cal. App. 5th at p. 497. Plaintiff urges the court to follow the 2nd Appellate Districts rulings in Ford Motor Warranty (Ochoa) 89 Cal.App.5th 1324 and Montemayor v. Ford Motor Company (2023) 92 Cal. App. 5th 958 (Montemayor). In Ford Warranty (Ochoa), the appellate court disagreed with Felisaldas equitable estoppel analysis. The court reasoned the Felisilda plaintiffs and the dealer agreed in their sale contract to arbitrate disputes between them about the condition of the vehicle does not equitably estop the plaintiffs from asserting FCA has no right to demand arbitration. Equitable estoppel would apply if the plaintiffs had sued FCA based on the terms of the sale contract yet denied FCA could enforce the arbitration clause in that contract. That is not what the plaintiffs did in Felisilda. The plaintiffs breach of warranty claims against FCA in Felisilda were not based on their sale contracts with the dealers. We disagree with Felisilda that the sales contract was the source of [FCA's] warranties at the heart of this case. Ford Warranty (Ochoa), supra, 89 Cal. App. 5th at p. 1334 (citing Felisilda, supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at pp. 495496, 266 Cal.Rptr.3d 640.) More recently in Montemayor, the Second Appellate District confirmed its view that equitable estoppel did not apply in a buyer versus manufacturer Song-Beverly action. Like the holding in Ford Warranty (Ochoa), the Montemayor courts ruling was based on the view that the statutory warranty claims did not arise from the RISC. Third party beneficiaries may be entitled to enforce arbitration clauses in contracts entered into on their behalf, even if not named in the agreement. (Macaulay v. Norlander (1992) 12 Cal. App. 4th 1, 7-8.) Nonsignatories seeking to compel arbitration as third party beneficiaries must prove that they are in fact third party beneficiaries of the agreement that provides for arbitration. This requires proof that the subject agreement is applicable to the controversy that is the subject of the litigation. Jones v. Jacobson (2011) 195 Cal. App. 4th 1, 22 (petition to compel arbitration denied because of lack of proof.) Moreover, the third party's right to enforce an arbitration provision is predicated on proving the contracting parties' intent. (City of Hope v. Bryan Cave, L.L.P. (2002) 102 Cal. App. 4th 1356, 1369.) The third party must show that (1) the third party must in fact benefit from the contract; (2) a motivating purpose of the contracting parties was to provide a benefit to the third party; and (3) permitting the third party to enforce the contract is consistent with the objectives of the contract and the reasonable expectations of the contracting parties. (Goonewardene v. ADP, LLC (2019) 6 Cal. 5th 817, 830.) In Ford Warranty (Ochoa), the court held that parenthetical language referring to third-party nonsignatories was a delineation of the subject matter of claims the purchasers and dealers agreed to arbitrate, but the purchasers clearly agreed only to arbitrate disputes between you and us, that is, with the dealership. (Ford Warranty (Ochoa), supra, at pp. 1334-1335.) In other words, [t]he third party language in the arbitration clause means that if a purchaser asserts a claim against the dealer (or its employees, agents, successors or assigns) that relates to one of these third-party transactions, the dealer can elect to arbitrate that claim. It says nothing of binding the purchaser to arbitrate with the universe of unnamed third parties. (Id. at p. 1335.) Tentative Ruling This court recognizes there is a split of opinion among the appellate courts and these cited cases are pending review by the California Supreme Court. Where a split of opinion exists at the appellate court level a trial court must choose which ruling to follow. A court is not obliged to follow the ruling from its own District. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County (1962) 57 Cal. 2d 450.) This Court opts to follow the Second Appellate Districts holdings in Ford Warranty (Ochoa) and Montemayor. Accordingly, the court finds the doctrine of equitable estopel is inapplicable to this matter. Here, Plaintiff does not allege breaches of the sales agreement (RISC) but rather statutory breaches of warranty. Nor does Plaintiff attempt to enjoy the benefits of the sales contract or enforce express terms of the RISC while repudiating his obligations to arbitrate. The court also finds that Defendant Mercedes has not demonstrated that it is a third-party beneficiary (e.g. employee, agent, successor or assign of the dealership) covered by the arbitration provisions in the RISC. Defendants Motion to Compel Arbitration is DENIED.

Ruling

SAVANNAH HAYNIE, ET AL. VS AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION

Jul 17, 2024 |22NWCV01760

Case Number: 22NWCV01760 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Dept: C HAYNIE, ET AL. v. AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR COMPANY, INC. CASE NO.: 22NWCV01760 HEARING: 7/17/24 @ 9:30 A.M. #2 TENTATIVE RULING Plaintiffs Savannah Haynie and Porfirio Hernandezs motion to compel further responses to Request for Production of Documents, Set One, is CONTINUED to October 2, 2024 at 9:30 a.m. in Dept. SE-C. Moving Party to give NOTICE. This is a Song-Beverly action. Plaintiffs move to compel further responses to Requests for Production of Documents, Set One, numbers 18-20, 22, 23, 26-30, 45-46, and 48-49. This matter was continued from May 22, 2024, when the Court ordered the parties to further meet and confer and submit a joint statement in 20 days. The parties submitted a joint statement on July 2, 2024, and there appear to be unresolved issues. The Court has reviewed the joint statement and finds that the parties still did not adequately meet and confer. The motion is CONTINUED to Wednesday, October 2, 2024 at 9:30 A.M. in Dept. SE-C. The parties are ordered to meet and confer again. If there are discovery issues they cannot resolve, they are to submit an AMENDED JOINT SEPARATE STATEMENT of the remaining issues by September 18, 2024. The parties are not foreclosed from seeking a trial continuance in Dept. SE-F.

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